We study the effect of consolidating fragmented trading by examining the response of liquidity and stock price to the exercise of deep in-the-money corporate warrants. This enables a relatively "clean" test of the value of trading consolidation. The exercise at the warrant expiration is fully anticipated and has no information content. The effect can come from the value of trading consolidation that improves liquidity. Indeed, we find that liquidity significantly increases, and stock prices increase significantly at warrant expiration. Further, the price increase is positively related to the pre-exercise extent of fragmentation, to post-exercise improvement in stock liquidity and to the proportional increase in the number of shares following the warrant exercise.
I. Introduction
The On the other hand, a number of theoretical studies showed that fragmentation hurts market performance. Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1982) studied the effect of having, in addition to the main market, order execution in "satellite" markets off the exchange floor. They showed that while this off-exchange execution is beneficial for brokers, it harms the market as a whole. Along similar lines, Cohen, Conroy and Maier (1985) showed that in a fragmented market there is a lower chance that an order will find a trading counterpart, an increase in the expected time a limit order has to wait until it is executed, and a wider bid-ask spread. Mendelson (1987) showed that the overall gains from trade decline as the market becomes more fragmented. Thus, theory suggests that fragmentation reduces liquidity.
Is the fragmentation of trading actually harmful to liquidity and, consequently, does it lower stock values? The answer is important for the design and regulation of securities markets. This issue took center stage since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pressured the NYSE to relax its Rule 390, which prohibited member firms from executing trades in NYSE-listed stocks off the Exchange floor. 1 In 1980, the SEC enacted Rule 19c-3 that allowed member firms to trade stocks off the exchange floor if they were listed after a cutoff date. More recently, this issue came up when Instinet applied for membership on a number of stock exchanges, which would have caused trading of the same security in two parallel systems.
The recent proliferation of electronic markets and trading platforms made market fragmentation more widespread, which led the SEC to issue a Concept Release examining the potentially harmful effects of fragmentation and ways to address them. In response, five major Wall Street brokers − Merrill Lynch & Co., Goldman, Sachs & Co., Morgan Stanley, Edward Jones and ABN Amro -joined to present a proposal to consolidate trading so fragmentation is avoided. The current regulatory approach to this issue is that markets and trading firms (broker/dealers) decide on whether or not the stock trades on multiple markets. A different approach was proposed by Amihud and Mendelson (1996) , who suggested that multi-market trading of a security should be controlled by its issuing firm, which is in the best position to decide on how trading in its securities should be conducted.
The empirical evidence on the effects of market fragmentation on trading costs is mixed. Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) studied the effects of enacting Rule 19c-3, comparing actual transaction costs for 300 NYSE-listed stocks that were also traded on regional exchanges and on NASDAQ. They found that both the effective bid-ask spread 1 See a comprehensive discussion of the consolidation/fragmentation issue in Cohen et al. (1986) , Amihud and the market-impact cost were larger for 19c-3 stocks. Lee (1993) analyzed the execution prices of adjacent trades for stocks listed on the NYSE and also traded offboard, in regional exchanges and on NASDAQ. He found that fragmentation increased transaction costs by 0.7 to 1 cents per share on average. On the other hand, Neal (1987) found that multimarket trading and inter-market competition in options trading was beneficial: American Stock Exchange (AMEX) options that were also traded in other markets enjoyed narrower bid-ask spreads than options that traded exclusively on the AMEX. Khan and Baker (1993) examined cases where regional exchanges attracted trades in listed stocks away from the main exchanges (NYSE and AMEX). Their results were mixed: low-liquidity stocks benefited from the competition of regional exchanges, whereas the liquidity of large, actively traded stocks was hurt by fragmentation.
The international evidence on the effects of multiple listing is similarly inconclusive. Pagano and Roell (1993) found that the bid-ask spreads on French stocks traded in London narrowed after the opening of the Paris Bourse, their home market, and widened again after the Bourse had closed. Yet, opposite results were found for Italian stocks traded in both Milan and London, where the fragmentation of trading between the two markets was associated with wider bid-ask spreads (Pagano and Roell (1990) Exchange of stocks that were already traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
Comparing the pre-listing prices of the dually-listed stocks to their prices 40 days after the dual listing (controlling for the market effect), he found that the prices of the duallylisted stocks declined as a result of the dual listing.
and Mendelson (1989a Mendelson ( , 1991 Mendelson ( , 1996 and Harris (1993 This paper comes close to performing a "pure" test of the value effects of consolidation. We study two practically identical securities that are traded side-by-side in the same market: a stock and a warrant on the stock that is deep in the money at expiration. On the day of the warrant expiration, the formerly fragmented trading in these two almost identical securities is completely consolidated. The company issues additional shares against the warrants, and from then on there is a single equity claim, with a larger float, that is traded in the market. Since the exercise of the warrant is fully anticipated, there should not be any information-related effect on stock price. However, if the consolidation of trading is valuable for liquidity reasons, we should find a positive effect of consolidation on the stock price on the exercise day.
Having multiple versions of the same security trading in the same market reduces liquidity because the order flow is fragmented. As a result, the price impact of a given order flow is larger, trading in each security is thinner, and liquidity is lower. The exact way in which fragmentation affects market performance depends on the market's trading mechanism.
Our sample comprises 123 warrant exercises on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) during 1992-97. Sixty-seven percent of the sample stocks and all warrants were traded once a day in a computerized Call Auction that resembles the "clearing house" mechanism analyzed by Mendelson (1987) . The rest of our stocks, comprising larger and relatively heavily traded stocks, were traded more frequently using the Variable-Price
Mechanism. Under the Variable Price Mechanism (hereafter VPM), trading opened with a call auction and proceeded with a series of sequential trading sessions in a trading arena which resembles a trading pit. There were no designated market-makers or specialists, and no measurable bid-ask spread (see Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997) ).
In the trading environment we study, traders could not take advantage of the liquidity available in one security when they traded in the other. Orders for each security (stock or warrant) were separate, and in many cases traders could rebalance their portfolios, in light of the executions they received, only on the following trading day. In stocks that traded using the VPM, trading was not continuous, but some offsetting and rebalancing trades were possible on the same day. Mendelson (1987) showed that this type of fragmentation between markets (or between two versions of the same security)
reduces the trading volume and the expected gains from trade as well the quality of price signals. Indeed, there could be differences between the underlying stock price and the price implied by the warrant's price on the same day, since the two prices were set separately. 3 Theory suggests that pure fragmentation hurts stock liquidity and value, and therefore, upon consolidation, both liquidity and value should increase.
We find that following the warrant exercise and the consolidation of trading in the two equity claims, the liquidity of the stock improved, attesting to the beneficial effect of consolidation. In addition, stock prices appreciated by 1.27%, on average on warrant expiration. This price increase, which is highly statistically significant, may appear inconsistent with market efficiency, since the warrant expiration is an anticipated event and the warrants were deep in the money. However, in order to gain from the price increase, an investor would have to buy the stock before the expiration and sell later, incurring transaction costs whose magnitude would eliminate most (if not all) of the gain from the price increase on the warrant expiration day.
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A loosely related literature examines the effect of options expiration on the behavior of the underlying stock price. 5 But options are a claim on existing shares, so 3 Evidence on price differences between practically identical securities is presented in Lauterbach and Wohl (2001) . They find that on most trading days the prices of two identical payoff government bonds differ, and attribute this difference to the fragmentation of trade -each bond was traded in a separate, yet contemporaneous, single daily auction. 4 These costs include the round trip costs of illiquidity and brokerage fees, as well as the costs of hedging or the risk premium of holding an unhedged, undiversified position in the stock. 5 Studies of options expiration present mixed results on the value effect. Klemkosky (1978) found negative abnormal returns on the underlying stock in the week before the expiration of options listed on the Chicago Board Options Exchange that was partially reversed in the subsequent week. Officer and Trennepohl (1981) found significantly negative abnormal returns on the Thursday and Friday preceding expiration, a negative (insignificant) return on the Monday following expiration, and a significantly positive partial their exercise does not broaden the market for shares. And, when options expire, new options series are generated on the same underlying stock, hence the trading of the stock and the option remains separate. In contrast, warrants are claims on new shares, so their exercise increases the number of shares traded and leaves only one active market for the security.
In what follows, we present tests on how the consolidation of trading, following the warrants' expiration, affected stock liquidity and stock prices. We describe the data in Section II and the effects of the exercise on the underlying stock trading volume and liquidity in Section III. Section IV tests the effects of the warrant exercise on stock value, and Section V presents our concluding remarks.
II. Data and Institutional Background

A. Data
To test the effect of consolidation on stock values, we collect data from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE), where companies commonly issue warrants. Most companies that go public issue packages consisting of stocks and warrants, with the warrants constituting a considerable part of the equity value. 6 Most of these companies are small and trading in their stock is thin. When the warrants are exercised, there is a sizable increase in the number of shares traded and a meaningful change in liquidity.
adjustment on Tuesday. Pope and Yadav (1992) found similar, albeit smaller, effects in the UK, and Bhattacharya (1987) found no evidence of abnormal price behavior of bond futures contracts either before or after the date of option expiration. However, Bhattacharya (1987) found evidence of increased price and volume volatilities prior to option expiration. With respect to the effects of option listing, Sorescu (2000) finds that prior to 1981, option listing increased the price of the underlying, consistent with earlier studies, whereas starting in 1981, option listing was associated with negative abnormal returns for the underlying. 6 Green (1984) showed that warrants reduce agency costs by reducing risk incentives in the presence of risky debt. Schultz (1993) proposed that issuing warrants at the IPO can help solve some agency problems in young entrepreneurial firms.
Our sample consists of all the warrants that were exercised on the TASE over the 1992-1997 period, except for three warrants for which data were missing. We confine the study to warrants that were considerably in the money before expiration, so their exercise was anticipated and did not pose any surprise. Also, a warrant that is in the money is more similar to the underlying stock than one that is at or out of the money.
Specifically, we include warrants for which the stock price was 10% higher than the exercise price three days before expiration. There were 123 warrants that qualified; the distribution of their "moneyness" is shown in Table 1 by the variable INMONEY, the ratio of stock price three days before expiration to the exercise price.
By the TASE rules, warrants ceased trading two days before expiration, and individual investors had to notify their broker of their intention to exercise their warrants no later than two days before expiration (institutional investors could notify their intention by the expiration day).
Data on the warrants and general trading statistics are collected from TASE
publications, mainly This Month in the Exchange, Daily Stock Prices, and Marketability
Guide (all in Hebrew). Data on stock prices and trading volumes are obtained from the database of Tochna Lainyan, a leading stock data dissemination company in Israel.
B. Trading Mechanisms
All warrants and most stocks traded on the TASE by the Call Auction method.
Before the auction, traders submit market and limit orders to the TASE, which electronically communicated the excess demand or supply for each stock and warrant at the previous day's closing price. Traders could observe these excess demand/supply values and submit additional orders in the opposite direction (only). That is, after the TASE announced the initial excess demand (supply), traders could submit sell (buy) orders only. The process was then repeated one more time. Finally, the TASE computed the new equilibrium prices that were announced simultaneously for all stocks and warrants.
Given this trading structure, traders would often remain with a residual demand to trade, which could be satisfied only on the following day's Call Auction. Further, arbitrage appears impossible, and price gaps emerge between the warrants and the underlying stocks that were traded separately. Thus, the fragmentation of trade brought about several problems, which increased the explicit and implicit costs of trading.
The problems of fragmentation were partly mitigated for the more heavily traded stocks that were traded by the Variable-Price Mechanism (VPM). These stocks opened with a call auction (as above), and then proceeded with a series of sequential trading sessions in a trading arena resembling a pit. In each session, stocks were announced in a predetermined order, and traders could execute bilateral trades until the market cleared.
Since some intra-day adjustments were possible when the stock was traded by the VPM, we expect the costs of fragmentation to be smaller for VPM stocks.
III. Trading Volumes and Changes in Stock Liquidity
A. Pre-exercise Fragmentation
Warrants constituted a sizable proportion of the equity of companies that have them. We calculate two measures of their importance. The first is RATWS, the ratio of warrants to shares of stock on the warrants' expiration day for each company. The second is VOLRWS, the ratio of the average daily trading volume of warrants to the average daily trading volume of the stock in the three quarters preceding the quarter when the warrants expired. (Volume is in monetary units.) The data are presented in Table 1 .
INSERT TABLE 1
The extent of fragmentation due to the existence of warrants on the stock was substantial. Warrants, when exercised, became a considerable proportion of their firms'
equity. In our sample, the average ratio of warrants to shares of stock (RATWS) is 18%, with a minimum of 7.6% and a maximum of 50.4%.
The ratio of trading volume in the warrant to trading volume in the stock (VOLRWS) was quite high prior to the warrant exercise. The warrant trading volume was 46.9% of the stock trading volume (see Table 1 ). This is noteworthy since the warrant price was lower than the share price, and warrants comprise only 18% of the shares of stock.
There are a number of explanations for the higher turnover of warrants. First, in the TASE, the public holds only a third of the stock, the rest being held by insiders who rarely trade. In contrast, public investors hold most warrants. For example, on December 2000, insiders held 33.8% of the warrants, an exact reverse of the holdings of stock. Thus, while warrants constituted 18% of the shares of stock, they represented a much larger proportion of the float in the company's equity claims.
Second, warrants provide a convenient way of leveraging the investment in the stock. In Israel, leveraging via warrants is less costly (in terms of transaction costs, fees and monitoring efforts) than taking a bank or broker loan and investing in the stock.
Hence, investors who wish to leverage may prefer the warrants to the stock.
Third, the high turnover of warrants relative to that of stocks may reflect induced arbitrage trading between warrants and the underlying stock in response to changes in their relative prices. This raised the turnover of warrants relative to stock, since the quantity outstanding of warrants was smaller. Pure arbitrage, however, was limited in
Israel because of the trading mechanism limitations described in II.B above, and because of various regulations that make it difficult and (relative to the U.S.) costly to short-sell securities.
B. Post-exercise Changes in Liquidity
We expect an increase in the liquidity of the underlying stock after the warrants are exercised. A commonly used measure of illiquidity is the stock's bid-ask spread.
However, there are no market-makers quoting bid and ask prices on the TASE and most stocks in our sample traded in once-a-day call auction. Therefore, bid-ask spreads were not available. Instead, we use three variables that proxy for liquidity.
Trading volume
The first measure of liquidity is the stock's trading volume. We expect the trading volume in the stock to rise, since trading that had previously taken place in warrants partially shifted to the stock, raising the stock's liquidity. We calculate the change in the relative trading volume in the stock as follows. Let DVOL j denote the change in the trading volume of stock j relative to the market volume:
(1)
where VOL is the average daily volume (in monetary units) and j and m indicate stock j and the market, respectively. "A" indicates the period of 200 days following the expiration window, days (+11, +210), "B" indicates the period of 200 days before the expiration window (days -210, -11), and the expiration window consists of the 20 days straddling the expiration day.
INSERT TABLE 2
The trading volume in the stock rose after the warrant exercise. The average DVOL is 0.115 with t = 1.96. This increase in average stock volume is insignificantly different from the average increase in number of shares following the warrant exercise.
The average increase in the stock trading volume is, however, significantly smaller than the extent of trading in the warrants relative to trading in the stock during the period before the warrant expiration. This reflects the advantages of warrant trading over trading the underlying stock, as discussed earlier. The evidence that stock trading volume rose less than the pre-exercise warrant trading volume may also reflect the elimination of trading that was induced by arbitrage between the warrant and the stock.
Adjusted implicit spread
The second measure of liquidity is based on Roll (1984) , who showed that the implicit bid-ask spread, SPREAD, can be calculated using the autocovariance of stock returns, COV j = Cov(R j,t , R j,t-1 ), as:
In this context, the implicit spread 8 reflects the transitory price impacts of temporary excess demand and supply, which cause the price to bounce between the bid and the ask.
Such bounces generate a negative COV, even when the "true" price of the stock is serially uncorrelated.
We calculate the COV j of each stock j from daily returns over 200 days before However, Roll (1984) found that for many stocks, COV j > 0, which he presented as a negative bid-ask spread. In fact, Roll (1984, The positive return covariance was attributed by Roll (1984) to "inefficiencyinduced positive dependence" in daily returns (p. 1134). Amihud and Mendelson (1987) proposed modeling this dependence using a lagged price-adjustment model. In their model, the "true" (log) price on day t, P * t , adjusts only partially to the intrinsic (log) value, V t , following (3) P * t = P t-1 + g⋅(V t − P t-1 ) , and the observed price on day t, P t , is related to the "true" price P t * by (4) P t = P t * + u t , where u t = S or -S with equal probabilities, reflecting the bid-ask bounce, and S is half the bid-ask spread. Equation (3) shows how prices gradually adjust to value innovations with an adjustment coefficient g, 0 < g ≤ 1. In addition, the intrinsic stock value V t evolves as a random walk with a constant positive drift and innovations e t , attributable to new information about the stock. The innovation series is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with Var(e t ) = v 2 .
In this model, the return autocovariance is given by
.
Equation (5) shows that COV becomes positive when (1-g)⋅ v 2 > S 2 . Essentially, partial price adjustment induces a positive autocovariance in stock returns, which can dominate the negative autocovariance induced by the bid-ask spread, when price adjustment is slow (g is low) and stock's volatility (v 2 ) is high. When g=1, equation (5) gives COV = -S 2 , as in Roll (1984) . Inverting equation (5), we can write the half spread S as a function of COV, g and v 2 :
Both v 2 and g are not directly observable. However, if their values remain the same before and after the warrant exercise, the decrease in the squared half spread, DS 2 , becomes
where DS 2 is our measure of liquidity change. Indeed, as v 2 reflects the variance of the rate of change in the security's underlying value, it should remain about the same before and after the warrant exercise. As for the adjustment coefficient g, since the stock's trading mechanism did not change, we do not expect a significant change in it. In our sample, differences in g emerge primarily because of differences in the stock's trading mechanism, and none of our stocks changed its trading mechanism. Amihud and Mendelson (1989b) show that for a diversified stock portfolio such as a stock index, the return autocorrelation ρ = (1-g). Thus, the adjustment coefficient g can be proxied by examining the autocorrelation coefficient of a portfolio consisting of stocks with the same characteristics as the stocks under study. Our sample stocks were naturally grouped into two portfolios based on their trading mechanism (and, implicitly, size). Eighty three of the stocks in our sample traded by the Call Auction method, were small and thinly traded, and were included in the TASE Yeter index. The remaining forty stocks traded by the VPM, were larger with relatively high liquidity, and are best represented by the value-weighted TASE index. During the sample period (1992-97), the daily autocorrelation coefficient ρ of the TASE value-weighted index was 0.13. Thus, for the forty larger stocks we used g = 0.87. For our smaller stocks that traded by the Call Auction method and were included in the Yeter index, we used g=0.70, because ρ of the Yeter index was 0.30. The finding that the autocorrelation of the TASE index was lower than that of the Yeter index is sensible, and reflects the tendency of prices of more liquid stocks to converge more quickly to the correct value.
Given that the Amihud and Mendelson (1987) measure of spread accommodates positive COVs, which is also the case for most stocks in our sample, we used DS 2 as a measure of change in spread and liquidity. As seen in Table 2 , the spread fell following the warrant exercise: the average decrease in the squared half spread, DS 2 , was 0.12 with t = 3.44.
The Relation of Liquidity Changes to Fragmentation
We attribute the increase in liquidity to the consolidation of trading, brought about by the warrant exercise. If so, the increase in liquidity should be positively related to the degree of fragmentation before the warrant expiration. To test this proposition, we estimate the models:
For DLIQUIDITY j we use DVOL j or DS j 2 , our measures of the change in stock liquidity at the warrant expiration. The right hand side variables are measures of fragmentation prior to the expiration. VOLRWS j is the ratio of the trading volume of warrants to that of the stock in the three quarters before expiration, and RATWS j is the ratio of the number of warrants to the number of shares of stock outstanding. After the warrants are exercised, they are converted into shares of stock. Thus, our hypothesis is that in both models, γ 1 > 0.
The estimation results of these models, presented in Table 2 , strongly support our hypothesis. The consolidation of previously fragmented trading leads to significant improvement in liquidity, measured by DVOL j or DS j 2 . And, the greater the fragmentation before the warrants' expiration, the greater the improvement in liquidity afterwards.
IV. The Effect of Warrant Exercise on Stock Values
A. Hypotheses
As discussed in the Introduction, theory suggests that the consolidation of trading may increase liquidity and thereby stock values. In general, there is a tradeoff between the costs of fragmentation and the benefits of inter-market competition. However, in the case at hand, both the underlying stocks and the warrants are traded in the same market.
Hence, inter-market competition does not exist, which enables us to directly examine the costs of fragmentation. Note that while each investor acts on his or her own in a way that is individually optimal, all investors collectively bear the costs of fragmentation. These costs are like a negative externality that no single investor will endeavor to correct on his or her own.
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Our main test is whether stock prices are affected by the consolidation of trading.
Given that the warrant exercise on the expiration day has no information content (we include only warrants that were deep in the money prior to expiration), our conservative null hypothesis is that the abnormal return on the stock is zero. Against this null, the first alternative hypothesis is:
H1: Stock prices should rise if fragmentation of trading is harmful and consolidation of trading is beneficial.
Hypothesis H1 can be reasoned as follows. On the expiration day, the number of shares increases and there is a consolidation of trading in the two securities -the stock and the warrant -that had previously been traded separately. The ensuing improvement in liquidity should bring about a higher stock price (Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) , Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997) ).
It could, however, be argued that warrants offer individuals flexibility and cheap leverage whose elimination, upon warrant exercise, reduces investors' welfare and weakens public interest in the stock (recall from Table 1 that warrant trading has a special appeal for investors). 11 We therefore consider a second alternative hypothesis:
H2: Stock prices should decline because of the elimination of trading opportunities afforded by warrants.
In fact, it could well be that both effects are present. Then, the results will show which effect is stronger.
B. Estimation Results
To test these hypotheses, we calculated the abnormal returns, 12 (9) AR jt = R it -RM t , 11 We are not aware of a theoretical body of research that directly predicts that this should affect the stock price. Yet, such an effect is plausible. 12 See Warner (1980, 1985) on this method of calculating the abnormal return. In our case it appears inappropriate to employ the conventional market model methodology and estimate the market model parameters in the period before the expiration. This is because in some cases a warrant entered our sample of exercised warrants after a rise in the price of the underlying stock before the warrant expiration.
where R jt is the return on stock j on day t, and RM t is the return on the market index on day t. When the stock traded by the Call Auction mechanism, which gave traders a single trading opportunity per day, the execution of nontrivial trading strategies may have required an extra day. Thus, for stocks traded by the Call Auction mechanism, it is possible that the price adjustment started a day before the warrant exercise, namely on Day -1. In contrast, when the stock traded by the VPM, traders had more degrees of freedom, as they could sequence their trades so that undesirable stock positions would be unwound later on the same day. When studying the price effect, we thus allow for a twoday adjustment period (Days -1 and 0), expecting a weaker Day -1 effect for the forty larger stocks that traded under the VPM.
We used different benchmark market indices for our two stock groups, according to their trading mechanism. For the forty large stocks in our sample, we used as benchmark RM t the value-weighted TASE index. For the 83 smaller stocks that traded under the Call Auction mechanism, we used as RM t the Yeter index. 13 The two-day cumulative abnormal return is defined as CAR j = AR j,-1 + AR j,o .
INSERT TABLE 3
The estimation results on CAR for days (-1,0) are presented in Table 3 . The mean CAR is +1.275% with t = 2.98, highly significant. The median is higher, 1.379%. Over 60% of the stocks had a positive CAR, significantly different from a chance result. The results thus strongly support hypothesis H1 against the null. Importantly, the price increase at the time of the warrant exercise is not transitory and it is not reversed: the average cumulative abnormal return over days (+1,+10) is +0.52% (t = 0.70). Also noteworthy, the pre-exercise CAR(-10,-2) is -0.04% (t=-0.05).
The estimated CAR may understate the value of consolidation. The exercise of warrants eliminated a convenient way for leveraged purchase of the stock, which may have been valued by investors. Then, CAR reflects the net result of the two effects described in H1 and H2. It is thus likely that the true value of trading consolidation exceeds our estimated CAR of about 1.3%.
Market efficiency considerations also suggest that our CAR is underestimated.
Recall that the exercise of deep in the money warrants is an anticipated event whose date is known in advance. If the CAR on expiration was large, investors could profit from the anticipated price increase by buying the stock before the warrant expiration day and selling it afterwards, earning an excess return during the holding period. Thus, market efficiency requires that the price increase on warrant expiration is bounded by the roundtrip transaction costs. If there was an anticipated price appreciation that exceeds the transaction cost, investors would trade to profit from it and the excess return would be eliminated.
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The CAR due to the consolidation of trading is expected to be higher for smaller, less liquid stocks for two reasons. First, the lower the liquidity of the stock, the greater the benefit from the improvement in liquidity following the exercise of warrants.
Second, transaction costs are larger for less liquid stocks. Since the price increase at the anticipated event -the warrant expiration -is bounded by the transaction costs, there is 13 The Yeter index started on 1993. For 1992, we used the TASE index for all stocks. 14 See Malatesta and Thompson (1985) for a discussion of the price effects of partially anticipated events. We just measure the residual effect. Estimating the full value effect of consolidation would require more room for appreciation in the price of less liquid stocks.
The evidence in Table 3 is consistent with our predictions. The average CAR for the 83 smaller stocks (traded in the Call Auction) is 1.67%, much higher than the average CAR of 0.45% for the larger stocks that were traded by the VPM. Further, the average excess return of the larger and more frequently traded stocks on Day -1 is -0.07%. Thus, the larger stocks that were traded by the VPM reacted only on the expiration day. In contrast, the smaller stocks, traded by the Call Auction method, had an average excess return of 0.69% (t=1.91) on day -1, and of 0.98% (t=2.70) on day 0. Evidently, these small stocks reacted on Day -1 in addition to Day 0.
The above results are consistent with our discussion of the relationship between the trading mechanism and the speed of price adjustment. When the stock was traded by the Call Auction method, traders may have needed two days to implement their trading strategies -one for the initial implementation and one for unwinding excess positions. In contrast, the VPM enabled traders to implement their strategies in a single day, using the multiple trading rounds in the stock on Day 0.
Hypothesis H1 posits that the rise in stock price is due to the increase in stock liquidity upon the consolidation of trading following the warrant expiration. We test this by examining the relation between CAR j and variables that reflect the liquidity benefits of trading consolidation. Our hypothesis is H3: CAR j is an increasing function of the liquidity benefits from consolidation.
This hypothesis is tested by the model
following the stock over a long period before and after the warrant entered into the money, a formidable task that is beyond the scope of this paper.
Hypothesis H3 suggests that δ 2 > 0, while the null is δ 2 = 0. The change in liquidity of the underlying stock is proxied by the same variables used in Section 2. Our first variable is the increase in the stock trading volume, DVOL j . If investors anticipate that the consolidation of trading between the warrants and the stock improves liquidity, the increase in stock price should be an increasing function of the increase in its trading volume. The second measure is our estimate of the decrease in squared half-spread, DS j 2 .
We thus estimate model (10) using DLIQUIDITY j = DVOL j or DS j 2 .
INSERT TABLE 4
Our hypothesis that δ 2 > 0 is supported by the estimation results in Table 4 . In column IV.1, we obtain for DVOL j δ 2 = 1.790 with a t-statistic of 2.47, significant. For DS j 2 , we obtain in column IV.2, δ 2 = 2.125 with t = 2.11, significant. Finally, we test whether the price increase at the time of warrant expiration -when the firm's equity claims are consolidated -is related to the extent of fragmentation beforehand. The greater the former fragmentation, the greater should be the price increase. As before, fragmentation is measured by the ratio of warrants to stock outstanding before the warrants' expiration. We test this proposition by estimating the model:
where RATWS j is the ratio of warrants to shares of stock before the warrant expiration, which reflects the proportional increase in the number of shares that results from the warrant exercise. Our hypothesis is that in (11), δ 2 > 0.
The results, presented in Table 4 (column IV.3), support our hypothesis on the value of consolidation: δ 2 = 6.154 with a t-statistic of 2.11, significant. The stock price increase at the exercise of the warrant appears related to the consolidation of trading between the deep in-the-money warrant and the stock.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we present tests of the hypothesis that consolidation of trading in securities is valuable. The test is quite "clean" of informational effect, in that it focuses on an event that is fully anticipated: the exercise of warrants that are outstanding on a publicly traded stock. The warrants included in our sample are deep in the money prior to the expiration day, and thus their exercise is quite certain. Therefore, any price change at the warrants' exercise can be attributed to the effect of the consolidation of trading in two equity claims -warrant and stock -that were traded separately beforehand.
The results show that the average two-day cumulative abnormal return on the warrant expiration is positive, 1.27%, and highly statistically significant. Importantly, the CAR is positively related to variables that reflect the degree of trading consolidation. It is an increasing function of the proportion of new shares added as a result of the exercise of the warrants, and it increases in changes in the liquidity of the stock following the warrant exercise. Further, CAR is higher for smaller stocks, traded under the Call Auction mechanism, where liquidity improvements can make a substantive difference.
The evidence presented here has important implications also for the design of corporate securities. Amihud and Mendelson (1988) proposed that firms should balance the advantage of having a number of different securities with different payoff patterns, which offer investors a greater choice, against the cost of lower liquidity that INMONEY equals stock price divided by the warrant exercise price, three days before expiration. Our sample includes only warrants for which INMONEY > 1.10. RATWS is the ratio of number of shares of stock that warrant holders obtain upon warrant exercise to number of shares of stock outstanding (before the exercise). VOLWS is the ratio of the average daily trading volume (in monetary units) of warrants to that of the stock during the three quarters preceding the quarter when the warrants expired.
The sample comprises 123 warrants over the period 1992-1997. 
. VOL is the average daily volume (in monetary units), and j and m indicate stock j and the market, respectively. "A" indicates the period of 200 days after the warrant expiration, days +11 to +210, and "B" indicates the period of 200 days before expiration, days -210 to -11. DS 2 = (2/g-1) DCOV is an estimate of the decrease in the squared half spread. In the calculations of DS 2 , we used g = 0.87 for the 40 Variable Price Mechanism stocks, g = 0.70 for the 83 stocks traded once a day in a Call Auction, and DCOV = COV A -COV B , where COV is the first order autocovariance of daily stock returns (multiplied by 1000). VOLWS is the ratio of the average daily trading volume (in monetary units) of warrants to that of the stock during the three quarters preceding the quarter when the warrants expired. RATWS is the ratio of number of shares of stock that warrant holders obtain upon warrant exercise to number of shares of stock outstanding (before the exercise). The sample comprises 123 warrant exercises over the period 1992-1997.
The estimated models are t-statistics are in parentheses. The t-statistics of the regression coefficients are calculated using robust estimation of the standard errors, following White (1980) . Warrants are included if the stock price was at least 10% above the exercise price on day -3. The sample comprises 123 warrant exercises over the period 1992-1997.
* t-statistic of the null hypothesis that the mean CAR equals zero. # t-statistic of the null hypothesis that the proportion of positive CARs equals 0.50. . VOL is the average daily volume (in Israeli currency) and j and m indicate stock j and the market, respectively. "A" indicates the period of 200 days after the warrant expiration, days +11 to +210, and "B" indicates the period of 200 days before expiration, days -210 to -11. DS 2 = (2/g-1) DCOV, where DCOV = COV A -COV B , COV is the first order autocovariance of daily stock returns (multiplied by 1000), g=0.87 for the 40 Variable Price Mechanism stocks, and g=0.70 for the 83 stocks traded once a day in a Call Auction. RATWS is the ratio of number of shares of stock that warrant holders obtain upon warrant exercise to number of shares of stock outstanding (before the exercise). The sample comprises 123 warrant exercises over the period 1992-1997.
t-statistics are calculated using robust estimation of the standard errors, following White (1980) .
